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Sports regulators and the 
potential for ‘breakaways’
The commercially lucrative aspect of sport presents regulators with 
the threat of breakaways by entities focused on profits, which may 
not be in the best interest of the sport. Simon Boyes, Director of the 
Centre for Sports Law at Nottingham Trent University, discusses the 
threat faced by sports regulators across different sports and asks 
whether rather than protecting traditional regulators the law may 
actually be providing a further obstacle to asserting any degree of 
control in preventing possible breakaways. 
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Elite sport has a higher value than ever 
before. The media and sponsorship 
rights of many professional sports have 
grown vastly over the last fifteen to 
twenty years, in parallel with the growth 
in television platforms, and with the 
emergence and spread of new digital 
technologies. Football, in particular, is  
of such importance that Rupert Murdoch 
once described it as the “battering 
ram” with which he would enter the 
pay-TV market in the United Kingdom. 
Notably, for the period 2016 to 2019 
the English Premier League secured 
a sum of £5.136 billion for domestic 
rights alone, with a further £3 billion of 
revenues being generated by the sale 
of overseas rights. The importance 
of football is also demonstrated by 
the ferocity with which BT Sport has 
entered into the market. Sponsorship 
is also prominent; by way of example, 
the London 2012 Olympic Games is 
estimated to have produced £700 million 
of sponsorship revenues, rising to in 
excess of £1.4 billion once worldwide 
revenues attracted by the International 
Olympic Committee are factored in.
Sports governing bodies - the regulators 
of sport - have certainly taken advantage 
of the economic opportunities available 
to them through media and sponsorship 
opportunities; very often the funds 
generated are deployed not only in 
support of the elite level, but also as 
a means of supporting grass-roots 
activities. Such opportunities also 
carry associated risks, however; they 
make the elite element of many sports 
attractive to ‘takeover’ by those primarily 
focused on profit, rather than on the 
best interest of a sport at all levels. The 
reality of many sports regulators is that 
they are not necessarily well-placed 
to operate in this new environment, 
seeking to balance the two extremes 
of participation - grass-roots and elite - 
which have grown substantially further 
apart in recent years. Many of these 
organisations have Victorian roots and 
were established as amateur, facilitative, 
rule-making organisations, rather than 
the sophisticated corporate structures of 
the modern world. The result is that as 
elite sport becomes increasingly valuable 
it also attracts growing levels of interest 
from commercial operators wishing to 
profit from this economic potential.
Football is perhaps the most obvious 
sport in which these changes are likely 
to happen, but there are many earlier 
examples of instances of ‘breakaways’ 
forming in other sports. Perhaps the 
most famous of these is that of World 
Series Cricket, established by Australian 
entrepreneur Kerry Packer in 1977 as 
a means of creating a product for his 
Channel 9 broadcasting company. 
World Series Cricket which saw 34 of 
the world’s best cricketers contracted 
to participate in a series of ‘Super 
Tests.’ The venture ultimately lasted 
only two years, as a result of litigation 
(discussed below) and of Packer’s 
reconciliation with the Australian Cricket 
Board, but it is a good example of how 
interests from outside a sport may 
seek to ‘take’ and exploit the most 
commercially viable elements of a 
sport from the traditional regulator.
In other cases sports regulators have 
been able to contain threatened 
breakaways by making accommodations 
within their own regulatory regimes. 
The split in professional darts in 1993 
was eventually resolved by an uneasy 
compromise which saw the ‘breakaway’ 
Professional Darts Council (‘PDC’) 
recognise the regulatory authority of 
the governing body, the World Darts 
Federation, whilst operating largely 
separately to it. That situation was, in 
significant part, fuelled by the commercial 
opportunities offered to the PDC 
through a deal with Sky Television. 
Similarly, Rugby League in the UK and, 
more substantially in Australia and New 
Zealand, has undergone a transformation 
with the introduction of SuperLeague 
and NRL respectively; ultimately a 
collaboration between the traditional 
regulators and broadcasters under the 
News Corporation banner. In football the 
Premier League and Champions League 
ultimately represent the accommodation 
of the interests of ‘big’ clubs, and the 
concentration of revenues at the top 
level, albeit within existing regulatory 
structures. Arguably these developments 
amount to a ‘soft’ breakaway, with the 
interests of the elite level overriding 
other stakeholders within the sport. 
Indeed, the House of Commons 
Culture, Media and Sport Committee 
has criticised the predominance of the 
interests of the Premier League and its 
clubs in the decision-making structures 
of the Football Association (Football 
Governance Follow-Up: Volume 1. HC 
509, p. 26). Similarly, UEFA absorbed into 
its structures the G14 Group of leading 
European club sides (now known as the 
European Club Association) as a means 
of averting the threat of a potential split.
All of this means that the regulators 
of sports with commercially attractive 
components, invariably the elite 
level or a part of it, find themselves 
increasingly vulnerable to the possibility 
of the breakaway of that aspect, either 
unilaterally or in conjunction with a 
commercial partner. This prospect has 
been heightened with the claim that 
a number of Europe’s top club sides 
met recently, with a view to discussing 
establishing a European Super League. In 
2013 it was reported that Qatar planned 
to establish a bi-annual European club 
competition, the ‘Dream League,’ to 
be played in the summer months, as a 
challenger to UEFA’s Champions’ League 
and FIFA’s Club World Championship. 
The claim was denied and has not 
transpired but, along with the European 
Super League claims, gives succour to 
the notion that the possibility of such a 
venture might not be too far distant.
Taken to its extremes it could be 
imagined that a major media company 
or, perhaps, sovereign wealth fund, 
might act in conjunction with major 
clubs sides to form a ‘World League.’ 
Such a league would, undoubtedly, be 
of interest to a huge global audience 
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Far from offering support to traditional 
regulators, it may be that the law provides a 
further obstacle in asserting any degree of 
control in preventing possible breakaways.
and the prospect of seeing the world’s 
best club teams face each other on a 
regular basis would likely grow media 
and sponsorship significantly beyond 
existing levels. Rather than operating 
in parallel with existing domestic and 
regional competitions, this sort of 
approach might lead to clubs splitting 
from the existing structures altogether. 
Taken together, enhanced incomes and 
the removal of demands on that income 
from other, less lucrative, parts of the 
game, provides a significant incentive 
for clubs and potential investors to 
actively consider such a move.
The difficulty faced by regulators is 
that, though they may at present have 
de facto monopoly over the regulation 
of their sport, they possess no de jure 
right to control and to regulate their 
sport. It is well settled that there is no 
intellectual property right in a sporting 
event itself; in Victoria Park Racing v. 
Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479 the claimant 
was unable to establish a cause of 
action to prevent commentary on 
horseracing being broadcast from 
neighbouring land. Similarly, the BBC 
was unable to prevent a rival broadcaster 
carrying radio commentary of the Euro 
2000 football tournament, based on 
television pictures, but broadcast as if 
live (BBC v. Talksport (2001) FSR 53). 
Most recently the Court of Justice of 
the European Union acknowledged 
the lack of a specific right in a sports 
event itself (Joined Cases C-403/08 
and 429/08 Football Association 
Premier League v. QC Leisure and 
Karen Murphy v. Media Protection 
Services Ltd [2011] ECR I-9083). Any 
breakaway competition would be unlikely 
to be able to use the existing rules 
and regulations; these are likely to be 
copyright work. However, this seems 
unlikely to present an insurmountable 
burden - World Series Cricket simply 
created its own regulations, thus 
avoiding any infringement of copyright. 
A remote possibility is that a regulator 
might be able to protect the format 
of the sport, as has been deployed 
in respect of television programmes. 
Again, however, small changes may be 
sufficient to negate this (as in Green 
v. New Zealand Broadcasting Corp 
[1989] 2 All ER 1056), and evidencing 
authorship, ownership and currency of 
any such right would be problematic 
for a sport such as football which has 
been codified for over 150 years.
While there may be no direct legal means 
by which sports regulators can prevent a 
breakaway, other possibilities are open 
to them. When Columbia split from FIFA 
for a brief period in the 1950s, many 
players from around the world took the 
lucrative opportunities available to them 
- instead of paying the players’ existing 
clubs transfer fees, the Columbian clubs 
were able to take the players for free and 
spend those monies on remuneration. 
Players coming home after Columbia 
returned to the fold and were made the 
subject of swinging sanctions. The threat 
of exclusion from a sport for participation 
in ‘unauthorised’ activity is, then, one 
means by which a regulator might seek to 
influence players and, as a consequence, 
exercise indirect control over clubs.
This indirect approach was the one 
adopted by the International Cricket 
Council (‘ICC’) and Test and County 
Cricket Board (‘TCCB’ - now the ‘ECB’) 
in relation to Kerry Packer’s breakaway 
World Series Cricket. The ICC amended 
its rules such that players participating 
in, or otherwise making themselves 
available for, an unsanctioned cricket 
match would be barred from participation 
in Test cricket. The TCCB followed suit, 
imposing a similar restriction in respect 
of English first-class cricket. The bans 
were ultimately litigated by a number of 
players in Greig v. Insole [1978] 1 WLR 
1520, who claimed that the restrictions 
were in restraint of trade and unlawful. In 
determining that case Slade J accepted 
the principle that imposing such limits on 
players was a legitimate and reasonable 
means of protecting the interests of 
cricket as a whole - recognising that 
the regulators were responsible for the 
welfare of the whole of the game, not 
simply the elite level. However, in this 
particular instance the bans had been 
imposed retrospectively which meant 
that they could not be reasonable and 
were, as a consequence, unlawful. 
This suggests a degree of control is 
available to regulators, however, it is 
indirect control. Were a World League 
to be sufficiently financially attractive 
to players, it might well be worth the 
risk of not being able to return to the 
mainstream game, and it would certainly 
be in the interests of any breakaway 
to ensure that the players were keen 
to participate in the competition.
Far from offering support to traditional 
regulators, it may be that the law 
provides a further obstacle in asserting 
any degree of control in preventing 
possible breakaways. In fact a regulator 
using its monopoly position to limit 
the development of new competitions 
might find itself falling foul of European 
Union competition law. In Case C-49/07, 
Motosykleistiki Omospondia Ellados 
Npid v. Elliniko Dimosio (MOTOE) [2008] 
ECR I-4863, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union indicated that a position 
of regulatory dominance on the part 
of a sports governing body must be 
exercised with care to avoid engaging in 
abuse. Nonetheless, Advocate General 
Kokott’s Opinion offers some degree 
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CAS reduces Sharapova’s 
doping ban as she was not an 
‘intentional cheater’
NEWS IN BRIEF
The Court of Arbitration for Sport (‘CAS’) issued its decision 
on 4 October 2016 in the arbitration procedure between 
Maria Sharapova and the International Tennis Federation 
(‘ITF’) reducing Sharapova’s suspension to 15 months. 
The Panel found that Sharapova had committed an anti-
doping rule violation and that while it was ‘no significant 
fault,’ Sharapova bore some degree of fault due to her 
failure to make sure that the substance contained in a 
product that she had been taking for a long period of time 
remained in compliance with the anti-doping rules. 
“The CAS found the ITF decision was unduly harsh and 
inaccurately failed to measure her ‘degree of fault.’ The CAS 
Panel went to great lengths to point out that Sharapova 
was not an ‘intentional cheater’ but rather an athlete who 
unknowingly ingested a banned substance. The Panel then 
took the ITF and World Anti-Doping Agency’s (‘WADA’) to task 
for failing to do more to warn Sharapova and other athletes 
when Meldonium was added to the 2016 Prohibited List,” 
explains Paul Greene, Founder of Global Sports Advocates.
Sharapova was suspended for two years and had her results 
at the 2016 Australian Open disqualified after being found to 
have committed an anti-doping violation involving Meldonium 
in June. Meldonium was added to the WADA list of prohibited 
substances list on 1 January 2016 and in March 2016 Sharapova 
was informed that a sample she had provided in January 
2016 had tested positive for the presence of Meldonium. 
Sharapova filed an appeal with CAS against the ITF’s decision 
arguing that she did not take the banned substance to 
enhance her performance and that her period of ineligibility 
should be reduced on the basis of ‘no significant fault.’
“It is an interesting decision, particularly with regard to the 
reasoning applied. The ‘no significant fault’ principle takes 
into consideration the principle of proportionality and WADA’s 
intention is to allow adjudicating panels to reduce the degree 
of fault, when there is evidence that the athlete took the 
necessary steps to ensure that no prohibited substance entered 
their system. This obviously needs to be contrasted with the 
unconditional duty of athletes that they are responsible for what 
they use and the Panel’s reasoning that an athlete relied on a 
third party or can delegate such duty to a third party, may be 
difficult to reconcile,” said Dr Gregory Ioannidis, Senior Lecturer 
at Sheffield Hallam University. “Although different panels may 
interpret Sharapova’s steps in a different light, the decision also 
sends a clear message to governing bodies to be more diligent 
in their efforts to notify athletes more appropriately and ensure 
that a substance only goes on the prohibited list when there 
is enough evidence of its performance enhancing effects.”
of comfort, noting the public interest 
in the uniformity and fairness of the 
conduct and regulation of competitions, 
and that an overarching regulatory 
framework is in the general interest. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this is 
that a regulator might legitimately take 
action to protect these wider interests 
without abusing a position of dominance.
All of the above discussion relates 
to general principle; it does not take 
into account the particular contractual 
arrangements which may tie-in clubs 
to their existing competitions and 
structures. Nonetheless, the wealth 
of sport, in particular football, has the 
inevitable consequence that challenges 
to existing regulators and competitions 
will arise in the near future. The sums 
involved are now at a level where outside 
interests will find it almost irresistible to 
seek to exploit that immense commercial 
value. The result might not be the sort of 
clear-cut split envisioned in the ‘World 
League’ scenario, outlined above - it is 
likely to be a more complex arrangement, 
perhaps involving existing regulators 
in some form of compromise deal. The 
reality is that they will have little choice; 
if such a project gains traction there is 
likely little that can be done to restrict 
it from a legal point of view. Perhaps 
the most significant inhibitor on any 
breakaway at present is of a practical 
nature; the high-risks involved in leaving 
the existing regulatory architecture. 
Should a breakaway fail then clubs 
might find themselves excluded from 
existing structures, with no competition 
in which to play, and effectively out 
of business. Nonetheless we can 
expect to see more schemes like the 
‘Dream League’ floated in the coming 
months and years and for one or more 
to come to fruition before too long.
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